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Abstract
In this work, we establish a frequency-domain framework for analyzing gradient-based
algorithms in linear minimax optimization problems; specifically, our approach is based on
the Z-transform, a powerful tool applied in Control Theory and Signal Processing in order
to characterize linear discrete-time systems. We employ our framework to obtain the first
tight analysis of stability of Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent (OGDA), a natural variant
of Gradient Descent/Ascent that was shown to exhibit last-iterate convergence in bilinear
games by Daskalakis et al. [DISZ18]. Importantly, our analysis is considerably simpler and
more concise than the existing ones.
Moreover, building on the intuition of OGDA, we consider a general family of gradient-
based algorithms that augment the memory of the optimization through multiple historical
steps. We reduce the convergence – to a saddle-point – of the dynamics in bilinear games
to the stability of a polynomial, for which efficient algorithmic schemes are well-established.
As an immediate corollary, we obtain a broad class of algorithms – that contains OGDA as
a special case – with a last-iterate convergence guarantee to the space of Nash equilibria of
the game.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental problem of converging to a Nash equilibrium in multi-agent systems has been a
topic of prolific research in several fields, including Mathematics, Economics, Algorithmic Game
Theory, Optimization [vNMR44, Nas50, Sio58, DGP06, NRTV07, Nes05] and more recently Ma-
chine Learning in the context of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [GPAM+14, ACB17]
and multi-agent reinforcement learning [HW98]. In particular, finding a Nash equilibrium in a
two-player zero-sum game with objective function f : X × Y 7→ R is tantamount to computing
a pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) ∈ X × Y such that
f(x∗,y) ≤ f(x∗,y∗) ≤ f(x,y∗), ∀(x,y) ∈ X × Y, (1)
where X and Y represent the space of strategies of each player respectively. In words, an
equilibrium – or a saddle-point – is a pair of strategies such that neither player can improve her
utility by a unilateral deviation. In this context, the celebrated min-max theorem implies that if
f(x,y) is a convex-concave function, then an equilibrium always exists; yet, it does not inform
us on whether natural learning algorithms can converge to a minimax pair with a reasonable
amount of computational resources.
This question has given rise to profound research, commencing from the analysis of fictitious
play by J. Robinson [Rob51], and leading to the development of the no-regret paradigm [CBL06,
BM05, AHK12]. However, despite the intrinsic appeal of this framework, these results usually
suffer from a lack of last-iterate guarantees, given that a regret-based – or time-average –
analysis cannot distinguish between a self-stabilizing system and one with recurrent cycles.
Indeed, it has been recognized that limit cycles persist in broad classes of no-regret schemes,
such as Mirror Descent [MPP18, PPP17, PP16, PS14]. It is important to point out that a
time-average guarantee is insufficient for two main reasons. First, practical applications pose
considerable impediments, and implementations of such algorithms could potentially require
enormous memory resources; e.g., training GANs through fictitious play would necessitate the
storage of millions of parameters at each time step [GLL+18, GXC+18]. Thus, it is strongly
motivated to design algorithms that perform the optimization step through a limited time
horizon. Moreover, the stability of the system is the primary desideratum from a control-
theoretic perspective, and subsequently of fundamental importance within Game Theory which
endeavors to analyze and control the behavior of rational agents.
These shortcomings of traditional learning algorithms – such as Gradient Descent/Ascent
(GDA) – were tackled by Daskalakis et al. [DISZ18] in the context of training GANs. Specif-
ically, the authors established a pointwise convergence guarantee for Optimistic Gradient De-
scent/Ascent (henceforth OGDA) – a natural variant of GDA that augments the memory of
the optimization with the previously observed gradient – for bilinear games, i.e. the objective
function is linear in the strategies of both players. This result has subsequently engendered a
considerable body of work along several directions [MLZ+19, LS19, MOP20, DP19, DP18]. Our
study follows this long line of research and addresses one such question: Can we extend the
last-iterate guarantee of OGDA to a broad class of first-order learning algorithms?
More precisely, building on the intuition of OGDA, we consider a general family of gradient-
based dynamics that augment the memory with multiple historical steps. This consideration is
strongly motivated by the no-regret literature, where learning through the previously observed
costs lies at the heart of the optimization. Naturally, the main challenge resides primarily in
the analysis, and elementary techniques appear to be of no use. In this context, our results are
established based on the Z-transform, a powerful tool for deriving a frequency-domain represen-
tation of linear dynamics. The main contribution of our paper is to reduce the convergence to a
Nash equilibrium – through the considered class of algorithms – to the stability of a polynomial,
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for which efficient algorithmic schemes are well-established in Mathematics and Control The-
ory. We illustrate the power of our framework in the analysis of OGDA, providing a remarkably
simple and precise characterization.
Related Work Our work follows the line of research initiated by Daskalakis et al. [DISZ18];
their main contribution was showing through an inductive argument that a natural variant of
GDA exhibits last-iterate convergence in unconstrained bilinear games. Their approach was
inspired by a technique previously introduced and applied in the fields of Online Learning and
Convex Optimization [RS13, SALS15, SL14, WA18], namely optimism. More precisely, this
technique is mainly employed when the future cost functions are smooth – or predictable; e.g.,
they derive from a regularized algorithm such as Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL). In
this case, it has been shown that optimism can substantially accelerate the dynamics.
Moreover, Liang and Stokes [LS19] established that the convergence’s rate of OGDA is linear,
assuming that the matrix of the game is square and non-singular. This result was also obtained
by Mokhtari et al. [MOP20], while they additionally extended the last-iterate guarantee of
OGDA in convex-concave minimax problems. In a closely related direction, [MOP20] also
considered a variant of OGDA with slightly perturbed coefficients. Their approach was founded
on the observation that OGDA can be examined as an approximate version of the proximal
point method [KT98].
The more challenging constrained case has also been recently addressed in a series of works.
First, Mertikopoulos et al. [MLZ+19] established a convergence guarantee for the projected
version of OGDA and Extra-Gradient methods through the Variational Inequality framework.
Furthermore, the optimistic variant of multiplicative weights was analyzed by Daskalakis and
Panageas [DP19]. A no-regret analysis of Optimistic Mirror Descent can be found in [KHSC18].
For a characterization of the stationary points of GDA and OGDA beyond convex-concave
settings we refer to [DP18]. Finally, several algorithms have been proposed specifically for
solving saddle-point problems; we refer to [ADLH19, SA19, MJS19] and references thereof.
Our Contributions In the first part of our work (Section 3), we analyze Optimistic Gradient
Descent/Ascent [DISZ18] in bilinear games, strengthening and improving prior results along
several lines. Specifically, we derive a concise expression for the characteristic equation of the
induced dynamical system (Proposition 3.1); subsequently, we obtain the first – to the best of
our knowledge – tight analysis of stability with respect to the learning rate, providing the exact
region of convergence in Theorem 3.1. Our characterization also implies the learning rate that
leads to the most rapid convergence (see Appendix A.1), a result which is of clear significance
in practical implementations of the algorithm. Our analysis is considerably simpler than the
existing ones, and is established through a frequency-domain representation of the dynamics.
In particular, we apply the Z-transform, a powerful tool employed in Signal Processing and
Control Theory to analyze linear discrete-time systems.
Moreover, we employ the Z-transform in order to study a general class of gradient-based
optimization algorithms in bilinear games (Section 4). More precisely, we first identify sufficient
conditions under which the limit points of the dynamics are Nash equilibria (Proposition 4.1).
Next, we reduce the stability of the dynamics to the stability of a polynomial(Theorem 4.1),
for which efficient algorithmic schemes are well-documented in the literature of Mathematics
and Control Theory. As an immediate consequence, we show that Optimistic Gradient De-
scent/Ascent is an instance of a broad class of algorithms that exhibit an analogous convergence
guarantee.
Our results strongly supplement the work of [MOP20], where the authors studied a variant
of OGDA with slightly perturbed coefficients. The class of algorithms we consider allows for
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arbitrary coefficients and importantly, incorporates multiple historical gradient steps – within
a certain bounded time horizon. Naturally, historical methods are of great importance within
the literature of Game Theory and the no-regret framework, and providing robust paradigms
for their analysis constitutes a crucial endeavor. We also believe that our approach could be of
independent interest in the realm of Optimization. Our only hypothesis is that the matrix of
the game is square and non-singular, a normative assumption (e.g. see [LS19, MOP20]) made
to simplify the analysis.
2 Preliminaries
Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent Consider a continuously differentiable function f :
X ×Y 7→ R that represents the objective function of the game, with f(x,y) the payoff of player
X to player Y under strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y respectively. Throughout this paper, we
focus exclusively on the unconstrained case, i.e. X = Rn and Y = Rm. Perhaps the most
natural optimization algorithm for solving the induced saddle-point problem is by performing
simultaneously Gradient Descent on x and Gradient Ascent on y; formally, if η > 0 denotes
some positive constant – typically referred to as the learning rate, GDA can be described as
follows:
xt = xt−1 − η∇xf(xt−1,yt−1),
yt = yt−1 + η∇yf(xt−1,yt−1).
(2)
However, there are very simple examples where the system of equations (2) diverges; for
instance, when f(x, y) = xy with x, y ∈ R and (x0, y0) 6= (0, 0), GDA is known to diverge
for any learning rate η > 0. This inadequacy has motivated optimistic variants of GDA that
incorporate some prediction on the next iteration’s gradient through the regularization term
(recall that Gradient Descent can be viewed as an instance of FTRL with Euclidean regularizer
[Sha12]). With OGDA we refer to the optimization variant that arises when the prediction of
the next iteration’s gradient is simply the previously observed gradient; this yields the following
update rules:
xt = xt−1 − 2η∇xf(xt−1,yt−1) + η∇xf(xt−2,yt−2),
yt = yt−1 + 2η∇yf(xt−1,yt−1)− η∇yf(xt−2,yt−2).
(3)
We remark that in our analysis of OGDA (Section 3) we allow η to take negative values,
although this consideration might appear counter-intuitive. In a bilinear game the objective
function is linear in the strategies of both players, i.e. f(x,y) = xTAy; here, A denotes an
n×m real matrix which will be referred to as the matrix of the game. We say that the dynamics
are stable if the strategies of both players converge.
2.1 The Z-transform
The purpose of this subsection is to review the Z-transform, and certain of its properties that
will be employed in the forthcoming parts of our study. Specifically, this tool is widely ap-
plied in Mathematics and Signal Processing in order to convert a discrete-time signal into a
frequency-domain representation; one should view it as the discrete-time analog of the Laplace
transform [Mur42]. Importantly for this wok, the Z-transform can greatly simplify the analysis
and the characterization of discrete-time systems. Indeed, in Control Theory the designer pre-
dominantly regulates the system’s behavior in the frequency domain; for an introduction to the
basic principles of Control Theory we refer to [KCY05, YLA13]. We should also point out that
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the Z-transform has numerous applications in Combinatorics, where the unilateral expression
is known as ordinary generating function (OGF) of a sequence; e.g. see [FS09, Knu11].
Consider a discrete-time signal xn ∈ R; we will assume that xn is causal, that is xn = 0 for
every n < 0. For causal signals, the Z-transform coincides with the unilateral – or one-sided –
Z-transform, and is defined as
X(z) = Z{xn} =
+∞∑
n=−∞
xnz
−n =
+∞∑
n=0
xnz
−n, (4)
where we assume that the frequency parameter z resides in the region of convergence:
ROC =
{
z ∈ C∗ :
∣∣∣∣∣
+∞∑
n=0
xnz
−n
∣∣∣∣∣ < +∞
}
. (5)
In our setting, the dynamics involve multi-dimensional signals that represent the players’
strategies throughout the evolution of the game. In this case, the Z-transform is defined by
applying the definition (4) in each coordinate or dimension of the signal. Moreover, a crucial
feature of the – unilateral – Z-transform is the following time delay property:
Z{xn+k} = zk
(
X(z)−
k−1∑
i=0
xiz
−i
)
, (6)
for some k ∈ N and x0, x1, . . . , xk−1 the initial conditions. This property greatly simplifies the
analysis of linear discrete-time systems, as it will be illustrated in the forthcoming sections. We
also remark the following special cases of (6) that will be used in the analysis of OGDA:
• Z{xn+1} = z(X(z)− x0)
• Z{xn+2} = z2(X(z)− x0 − x1z−1)
Of course, it is easy to see that these properties also extend for the multi-dimensional
definition. In this context, we state a fundamental theorem in Signal Processing that connects
the asymptotic behavior of a causal signal with its Z-transform.
Theorem 2.1. Let xn a causal discrete-time signal with X(z) = Z{xn} a rational function;
then, xn converges for n → ∞ if and only if every pole of X(z) resides inside the unit circle1,
except from at most one pole at z = 1.
Note that the poles of a rational function in reduced form – the denominator has no common
factors with the nominator – coincide with the roots of the polynomial in the denominator. As a
result, the convergence of the dynamics can be reduced to analyzing the roots of a polynomial.
For a comprehensive study on the Z-transform and applications in discrete-time systems we
refer to [Oga95, RZ52, EA05] and references thereof.
Transfer Function Consider a linear discrete-time system that maps an input signal xt to
an output signal yt through the following difference equation:
anyt+n + · · ·+ a0yt = bmxt+m + · · ·+ b0xt, (7)
for some real coefficients a0, . . . , an, b0, . . . , bm. The transfer function of the system H(z) is
defined as
1Recall that the unit circle in the complex plane is defined as U1 = {z ∈ C : |z| = 1}.
4
H(z) =
Y (z)
X(z)
=
b0 + b1z + · · ·+ bmzm
a0 + a1z + · · ·+ anzn . (8)
Notice that in the definition of the transfer function, the initial conditions are taken to be zero.
Notation We use lowercase boldface for time domain vectors and capital boldface for fre-
quency domain vectors. We represent with t the discrete time, while subscripts mainly refer
to time indices. We use Ik and 0k×` to refer to the identity matrix of size k × k and the zero
matrix of size k × ` respectively; when k = ` we simply write 0k instead of 0k×k. For a matrix
S, we denote with ||S|| the spectral norm of S, i.e. the square root of the maximum eigenvalue
of STS. Finally, a polynomial is said to be stable if all of its roots reside within the unit circle
in the complex plane.
3 Analysis of OGDA
In this section, we employ the Z-transform in order to analyze OGDA in bilinear and uncon-
strained zero-sum games; that is, f(x,y) = xTAy, X = Rn, and Y = Rm. We will allow
arbitrary initial conditions, represented with x0,x1 ∈ Rn and y0,y1 ∈ Rm respectively. In this
setting, the update rules of OGDA (3) can be described for any t ≥ 0 as follows:
xt+2 = xt+1 − 2ηAyt+1 + ηAyt,
yt+2 = yt+1 + 2ηA
Txt+1 − ηATxt.
(9)
These equations can be expressed more concisely in matrix form as(
xt+2
yt+2
)
=
(
In −2ηA
2ηAT Im
)(
xt+1
yt+1
)
+
(
0n ηA
−ηAT 0m
)(
xt
yt
)
. (10)
In correspondence to the last expression, let us introduce the following matrices:
B =
(
In −2ηA
2ηAT Im
)
, C =
(
0n ηA
−ηAT 0m
)
,wt =
(
xt
yt
)
. (11)
With this notation, Equation (10) can be re-written as
wt+2 = Bwt+1 + Cwt. (12)
Let us denote with W(z) = Z{wt} the Z-transform of wt; if we transfer Equation (12) in
the frequency domain and apply the time delay property (6) it follows that
z2(W(z)−w0 −w1z−1) = zB(W(z)−w0) + CW(z) ⇐⇒
(z2In+m − zB − C)W(z) = (z2In+m − zB)w0 + zw1,
where we assume that z resides in the region of convergence of W(z). Therefore, it is easy to
see that W(z) can be expressed as a rational function in every dimension; indeed, recall that
for a non-singular and square matrix S
S−1 =
adj(S)
det(S)
, (13)
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where if Mij denotes the (i, j)-minor of S - the determinant of the matrix that results from
removing the ith row and the jth column from S, adj(S)ij = ((−1)i+jMij)T . As a result, each
entry of matrix adj(z2In+m − zB − C) is a polynomial of z and hence, W(z) can be expressed
- in each dimension - as the ratio of two polynomials. Note that this property holds for any
sequence that satisfies a linear difference equation. Thus, the characteristic equation of the
system can be expressed as
det(z2In+m − zB − C) =
∣∣∣∣ (z2 − z)In (2z − 1)ηA−(2z − 1)ηAT (z2 − z)Im
∣∣∣∣ = 0. (14)
With the assumption that m = n, this determinant can be expanded as∣∣∣∣ (z2 − z)In (2z − 1)ηA−(2z − 1)ηAT (z2 − z)Im
∣∣∣∣ = det ((z2 − z)2In + (2z − 1)2η2AAT ) , (15)
where we employed a well-known identity for the determinant of a block matrix. Let α(z)
represent the characteristic polynomial of matrix η2AAT – or equivalently η2ATA; given that
z = 1/2 is not a root of Equation (14) it follows that
(14) ⇐⇒ det
((
z2 − z
2z − 1
)2
In + η
2AAT
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ α
(
−
(
z2 − z
2z − 1
)2)
= 0. (16)
As a result, we have derived a concise expression for the characteristic equation of the system
as a function of the spectrum of matrix A and the learning rate η.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a square matrix A, and some learning rate η; if α(z) represents
the characteristic polynomial of matrix η2AAT , the characteristic equation of OGDA in bilinear
games (9) can be expressed as
χ(z) = α
(
−
(
z2 − z
2z − 1
)2)
= 0. (17)
This expression provides a complete characterization of the stability of the system, as well
as the rate of convergence. To be more precise, let P the set of the roots of χ(z) = 0. For
a non-singular matrix A it follows that 1 /∈ P; hence, we know from Theorem 2.1 that the
dynamics converge if and only if |z| < 1,∀z ∈ P. Moreover, assuming that the system is stable,
the rate of convergence is determined by the root with the largest norm; i.e. if λ is the rate of
convergence, it follows that λ = max{|z| : z ∈ P}. We should also remark that the region of
convergence of W(z) can be expressed as
ROC = {z ∈ C∗ : |z| > max{|z′| : z′ ∈ P}}. (18)
Through this prism, the stability criterion for the system is equivalent to ejθ ∈ ROC –
for any θ. Having established Proposition 3.1, the remainder of the analysis reduces to trivial
algebraic calculations (see Appendix A.1). In particular, considering the non-trivial case of
γ = ||A|| 6= 0, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Consider a square and non-singular matrix A. For any learning rate η such that
|η| < 1/(√3γ) OGDA (9) converges from any initial state, whilst for η such that |η| ≥ 1/(√3γ)
the behavior of the dynamics is inherently unstable 2.
2The instability is implied in the sense that at least under certain initial states the dynamics will not converge.
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A surprising consequence of this theorem is that the stability of the system and indeed, the
rate of convergence depends on η2; thus, the dynamics could converge with negative learning
rate (see Figure 1), a very counter-intuitive property in the context of Gradient Descent.
We provide a simple example to illustrate the main implications of Theorem 3.1. In partic-
ular, we consider the objective function f(x, y) = xy for x, y ∈ R. We exhibit the qualitative
behavior of OGDA and the impact of the learning rate in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1: The behavior of the dynamics for different values of learning rate. Note that the blue
spiral corresponds to a positive η, while the orange spiral to the corresponding negative. The red point
represents the initial state of the system. It is important to point out that Proposition 3.1 implicitly
provides the learning rate that leads to the most rapid convergence, establishing an exact characterization
of the convergence’s rate with respect to η. In our simple example, the optimal learning rate is η = 0.5,
illustrated in the rightmost image.
Finally, we conclude this section with a characterization of the limit points of OGDA;
specifically, it is easy to establish the following claim.
Proposition 3.2. If OGDA converges, the limit points are Nash equilibria 3.
Proof. We first remark that a pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the bilinear
game if and only if Ay∗ = 0 and ATx∗ = 0. Assuming that the dynamics converge, we denote
with x∞ = limt→+∞ xt and y∞ = limt→+∞ yt. It follows from Equation (9) that
lim
t→+∞(xt+1 − xt) = 0 = −2ηAy∞ + ηAy∞ =⇒ Ay∞ = 0, (19)
lim
t→+∞(yt+1 − yt) = 0 = −2ηA
Tx∞ + ηATx∞ =⇒ ATx∞ = 0. (20)
We should point that if A is square and non-singular the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game is at (x∗,y∗) = (0,0); nonetheless, Proposition 3.2 holds for any arbitrary matrix A. In
the following section we provide a general characterization of the limit points for a broad class
of linear optimization algorithms, extending the result of Proposition 4.1.
3This proposition posits that η 6= 0; otherwise, the limit points coincide with the initial state
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Figure 2: The behavior of the dynamics near the critical value of the learning rate. In particular,
according to Theorem 3.1 the system converges only if η < 1/
√
3 ' 0.577. Thus, we can indeed verify
the transition of the system from stability (leftmost image) to divergent behavior (rightmost image). We
also remark that the convergence of the system becomes gradually slower as the learning rate exceeds
the optimal value of η = 0.5 and advances towards the critical point.
4 Historical Methods
In this section, we analyze a general class of linear gradient-based optimization algorithms.
More precisely, consider some constant parameter k that corresponds to the time horizon of
each player. Note that for Gradient Descent/Ascent this parameter would be k = 1 as the step
of each player depends only on the current state of the system, while the optimistic variant we
analyzed in the previous section has a k = 2 time horizon since it incorporates an additional
historical gradient. More broadly, we consider the following update rules for t ≥ 0:
xt+k =
k∑
i=1
pixt+k−i − η
k∑
i=1
qi∇xf(xt+k−i,yt+k−i),
yt+k =
k∑
i=1
piyt+k−i + η
k∑
i=1
qi∇yf(xt+k−i,yt+k−i),
(21)
where x0, . . . ,xk−1 ∈ Rn and y0, . . . ,yk−1 ∈ Rm the initial conditions of the system, and
p1, . . . , pk, q1, . . . qk ∈ R some real parameters. These dynamics will be referred to as Historical
Gradient Descent/Ascent (henceforth HGDA). Let us elaborate on Equation (21) for the case
of bilinear games. Specifically, one should distinguish the following two main components in
the dynamics:
Smoothness Term The first component of the HGDA dynamics is the smoothness or ex-
ploitation term, and determines how the previously followed strategies within the time horizon
regularize the forthcoming action. For instance, in OGDA (or indeed GDA) this particular term
for the x player would take the form S{xt} = xt+1 − xt. In general, the smoothness term can
be expressed as
8
S{xt} = xt+k − p1xt+k−1 − · · · − pkxt. (22)
The smoothness term can be captured through the transfer function S(z) of system (22); in
particular, it follows that
S(z) = zk − p1zk−1 − p2zk−2 − · · · − pk. (23)
Gradient Term The second component of the HGDA dynamics is the gradient or exploration
term, and determines how each player explores the space of strategies through the previously
observed gradients. Notice that for bilinear games ∇xf(x,y) = Ay and ∇yf(x,y) = ATx;
thus, the gradient term follows after applying a linear transformation to the opponent’s previous
strategies. Let us focus on the weighted average of the opponent’s strategies within the time
horizon. For OGDA, this weighted average would be G{yt} = 2yt+1 − yt; in general, it can be
expressed as
G{yt} = q1yt+k−1 + · · ·+ qkyt. (24)
Similarly, the transfer function of system (24) can be written as
G(z) = q1z
k−1 + q2zk−2 + · · ·+ qk. (25)
As a result, HGDA in bilinear games obtains the following form:
S{xt} = −ηAG{yt},
S{yt} = ηATG{xt}.
(26)
First, we provide sufficient conditions under which the study of the induced dynamical
system (26) is meaningful from a game-theoretic standpoint. More precisely, we prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. Consider the HGDA dynamics (26) such that S(1) = 0 and G(1) 6= 0; then,
if the dynamics converge, the limit points are Nash equilibria 4.
Proof. First, we have that
S(1) = 0 ⇐⇒
k∑
i=1
pi = 1, (27)
G(1) 6= 0 ⇐⇒
k∑
i=1
qi = q0 6= 0. (28)
Recall that a pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if Ay∗ = 0 and
ATx∗ = 0. Let x∞ = limt→+∞ xt and y∞ = limt→+∞ yt; it follows that
lim
t→+∞S{xt} = x∞
(
1−
k∑
i=1
pi
)
= 0, (29)
4We again assume that η 6= 0.
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lim
t→+∞G{yt} = y∞
k∑
i=1
qi = q0y∞. (30)
Therefore, it follows from (26) that 0 = −ηq0Ay∞ ⇐⇒ Ay∞ = 0, since we have assumed
that η 6= 0. Analogously, we can show that ATx∞ = 0.
As a result, we have reduced finding the Nash equilibrium to the stability of the dynamical
system (26). It is also easy to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2. The HGDA dynamics (26) can be transformed in the z-space as(
S(z)In G(z)ηA
−G(z)ηAT S(z)Im
)
W(z) = Q(z;w0,w1, . . . ,wk−1), (31)
where Q(z) ∈ Rn+m is a polynomial of z in each dimension that depends on the initial state of
the system.
This proposition follows directly after transferring (26) to the z-space and applying the
generalized time delay property (6). Moreover, Proposition 4.2 implies that the characteristic
equation of HGDA in bilinear games can be expressed as∣∣∣∣ S(z)In G(z)ηA−G(z)ηAT S(z)Im
∣∣∣∣ = 0. (32)
It is clear that every common root of G(z) and S(z) will also satisfy Equation (32), yielding
an additional constraint on the structure of the optimization algorithm. In particular, let P
denote the set of all common roots of G(z) and S(z), and consider the following polynomial:
P (z) =
∏
ρ∈P
(z − ρ). (33)
In this context, we proceed with the following factorization: G(z) = P (z)G′(z) and S(z) =
P (z)S′(z); notice that the polynomials G′ and S′ do not have common roots. Applying this
factorization yields that
(32) ⇐⇒ (P (z))n+m
∣∣∣∣ S′(z)In G′(z)ηA−G′(z)ηAT S′(z)Im
∣∣∣∣ = 0. (34)
As a result, we are able to reduce the stability of Historical Gradient Descent/Ascent in
bilinear games to the stability of a polynomial, as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Consider a square and non-singular matrix A, and let xn + a1x
n−1 + · · · + an
the characteristic polynomial of matrix η2AAT ; then, converging to a Nash equilibrium through
HGDA in bilinear games reduces to the stability of the following polynomial:
(−S2(z))n + a1(−S2(z))n−1(G2(z)) + · · ·+ an(G2(z))n, (35)
where S(z) and G(z) are the transfer functions of the smoothness and the gradient term respec-
tively with S(1) = 0 and G(1) 6= 0.
Proof. First, we have that∣∣∣∣ S′(z)In G′(z)ηA−G′(z)ηAT S′(z)Im
∣∣∣∣ = det ((S′(z))2In + (G′(z))2η2AAT ) . (36)
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Let R denote the set of roots of G′(z) = 0. If α(z) represents the characteristic polynomial
of matrix η2AAT , it follows that for z /∈ R
(34) ⇐⇒ (P (z))2nα
(
−
(
S′(z)
G′(z)
)2)
= 0. (37)
Moreover, for z /∈ R we obtain that
(37) ⇐⇒ (−S2(z))n + a1(−S2(z))n−1(G2(z)) + · · ·+ an(G2(z))n = 0. (38)
Finally, consider some ρ ∈ R. It is clear that ρ satisfies (34) if and only if ρ ∈ P; as a result,
Equation (34) is equivalent to Equation (38) without the constraint z /∈ R, and the theorem
follows directly from Proposition 4.1.
Singular Case Our reduction (Theorem 4.1) is only applicable for a square and non-singular
matrix. Indeed, let us assume that det(A) = 0. It follows that z = 1 is a (multiple) root of Equa-
tion (35) and hence, the induced polynomial is not stable. However, recall from Theorem 2.1
that the dynamics could converge with a factor of (z− 1) in the denominator; in fact, this term
determines the steady state solution – or the limit points – of the dynamics. Yet, handling the
singular case appears to be technically challenging in the z-space, as one would have to argue
about the multiplicity of the factor (z − 1) in the adjoint matrix adj(S2(z)In + G2(z)η2AAT )
(recall (13)).
Stability of a Polynomial The problem of characterizing the stability of a polynomial has
been thoroughly investigated and understood in Mathematics and Control Theory. First, al-
though deriving closed-form solutions for arbitrary polynomials is impossible (Abel’s Theorem),
numerical methods yield very accurate approximations [Leh61]; in this context, Theorem 4.1
also implies the rate of convergence – up to some small error. Moreover, the literature of Con-
trol Theory provides efficient algorithmic schemes for characterizing the stability of an arbitrary
polynomial. Most notably for discrete-time systems, we mention the Bistritz criterion and the
Jury test. The details of these methods extend beyond the scope of our work; we refer the
interested reader to [VK77, Bis84, PJ93, Bis02] and references thereof.
Finally, as a concrete example we consider the set of HGDA algorithms with S(z) = z(z −
1)P (z) and G(z) = (2z − 1)P (z), where P (z) is a stable polynomial; notice that S(1) = 0
and G(1) 6= 0, as required by Proposition 4.1. It should be clear that OGDA is an instance
of this class for P (z) = 1. In this case, the convergence of the dynamics is implied – for any
η < 1/(
√
3γ) – by Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1. As a result, we have identified an infinite
class of optimization algorithms with a convergence guarantee to the Nash equilibrium of the
game.
5 Concluding Remarks
The main contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we provided an exact characterization of
Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent in bilinear games through a remarkably simple analysis.
More importantly, we introduced a novel class of optimization algorithms – namely Historical
Gradient Descent/Ascent, and we established an algorithmic procedure for evaluating the sta-
bility of the dynamics in bilinear games. Our results have been founded on the Z-transform, a
robust tool for characterizing linear discrete-time systems.
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We believe that the stability of OGDA – and variants thereof – can be better understood
through the lens of Control Theory. In particular, the optimistic term should be construed
as a regulator that stabilizes the system. An interesting avenue for future research would be
to stabilize Gradient Descent/Ascent via explicit techniques from Control Theory; e.g. the
celebrated method of PID control. Moreover, our work has left open the case of a singular
or non-square matrix, although this direction may be technically challenging. Finally, our
frequency-domain framework can be directly applied to analyze and control continuous-time
dynamics through the Laplace transform.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. Let Λ be the set of eigenvalues of matrix η2AAT – or equivalently η2ATA – and let
λ ∈ Λ; notice that λ > 0, given that η2AAT is symmetric and positive definite. Proposition 3.1
implies that λ induces a root z in the characteristic equation of the system (9) such that(
z2 − z
2z − 1
)2
= −λ ⇐⇒ z
2 − z
2z − 1 = ±
√
λj, (39)
where j denotes the imaginary unit. This equation yields the following quadratic equations:
z2 − z(1 + 2
√
λj) +
√
λj = 0, (40)
z2 − z(1− 2
√
λj)−
√
λj = 0. (41)
It is easy to see that a complex number z satisfies Equation (40) if and only if its conjugate z¯
is a solution to Equation (41); hence, it suffices to restrict our attention to the former quadratic
equation, given that the induced solutions have the same norm. In particular, Equation (40)
has the following solutions:
z1,2(λ) =
1 + 2
√
λj ±√1− 4λ
2
. (42)
We first consider the case where λ ∈ (0, 14]; specifically, it follows that
|z1(λ)| =
√
2 + 2
√
1− 4λ
2
, (43)
|z2(λ)| =
√
2− 2√1− 4λ
2
. (44)
As a result, for all λ ∈ (0, 14] it holds that |z1(λ)|, |z2(λ)| < 1 (see Figure 3). Next, we
investigate the case where λ > 1/4; in particular, we obtain that
|z1(λ)| =
√
2λ+
√
λ(4λ− 1), (45)
|z2(λ)| =
√
2λ−
√
λ(4λ− 1). (46)
It is easy to see that |z2| < 1 and hence, the region of convergence is determined by the
solutions of the inequality |z1(λ)| < 1, for all λ ∈ Λ. Note that for the λ > 1/4 that satisfies
|z1(λ)| = 1 the system oscillates, given that z1(λ) 6= 1 (⇐⇒ λ 6= 0). Moreover, it follows that
|z1(λ)| < 1 ⇐⇒ λ < 1/3 (see Figure 3). As a result, the system is stable if and only if every
eigenvalue of η2AAT is smaller than 1/3, or equivalently η2γ2 < 1/3, completing the proof.
Optimal Learning Rate Our analysis directly provides the learning rate that optimizes the
rate of convergence. Specifically, let λmin = min{λ : λ ∈ Λ} and λmax = max{λ : λ ∈ Λ}. Note
that the rate of convergence depends on the norm of the z1(λ) branch of solutions (the blue
curve in Figure 3), since |z1(λ)| ≥ |z2(λ)|, ∀λ > 0. Indeed, the rate of convergence depends on
the root with the largest norm. We consider the following two cases:
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• Case λmin = λmax (i.e. all the eigenvalues of AAT are equal): The optimal learning rate
is simply ηopt = 1/(2
√
λmax) = 1/(2γ); for instance, see our example in Figure 1.
• Case λmin 6= λmax: Consider that we begin with a very small learning rate, and we
gradually increment its value. Then, the solutions |z1(λ)|, for λ ∈ Λ, will progressively
traverse the blue curve in Figure 3. It is easy to see that the rate of convergence - i.e.
the max{|z1(λ)| : λ ∈ Λ} - will decrease (the dynamics will accelerate), until we reach the
learning rate ηopt that satisfies |z1(η2optλmin)| = |z1(η2optλmax)|. Naturally, it follows that
η2optλmin < 1/4 and η
2
optλmax > 1/4 and thus, we can obtain the optimal learning rate ηopt
through Equations (43) and (45).
Figure 3: The norm of the solutions of Equation (40) with respect to λ.
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